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INTRODUCTION

On December 10, 2019, two plaintiffs with disabilities sued the Canadian County District Court, 26th Judicial District, alleging that the Oklahoma court system's bail practices violated the Americans with Disabil1
ities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Among other claims, the
plaintiffs allege that the district is "violating Title II of the ADA by administering a bail policy that does not take into consideration an individual's disability [and] does not provide the modifications or effective communication services that the person may need to participate equally in the
2
initial appearance or arraignment proceedings." The 26th Judicial District
filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the district was not an entity that
could be sued and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim because
3
they do not allege that they ever requested modifications. The Motion to
Dismiss is pending before Judge Jodi Dishman of the United States Dis4
trict Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.
This note will seek to assess and build on the claims alleged in White
v. Hesse. PartI of this note will consider the arguments raised so far in the
briefing, concluding that the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim to
defeat the Motion to Dismiss. In doing so, the note will highlight arguments that litigants could raise to challenge bail practices in other
Complaint at 46, 48, White v. Hesse, No. 5:19-cv-01145 (W.D. Okla. filed Dec. 10, 2019)
'
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-OK-0005-OOOl.pdf. [https://perma.cc/9GBL-8HG
X]. Misty White, Janara Musgrave, and four others seek to represent a "primary class of all arrestees
who are detained by Canadian County . .. for whom a secured financial condition of release has been
set, without the presence of counsel, and who cannot afford the amount necessary for release on the
secured money bail." Id. at 35. They raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for multiple alleged constitutional violations. Id. at 43-46. White and Musgrave further seek to represent a "disability subclass"
of "all arrestees with a disability." Id. at 35. This subclass raises the claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Id. This note focuses on White and Musgrave's individual disability claims, without
addressing the other claims or the questions of class certification.
Id. at 47. In addition to the district, the Complaint names five district judges as defendants. The
2
judges have filed a Motion to Dismiss that, among other claims, raises arguments of judicial and legislative immunity. Motion to Dismiss of State Judges at 6, 7, White v. Hesse, No. 5:19-cv-01145 (W.D.
Okla. Jan. 22, 2020). This note will focus only on the 26th Judicial District.
3 Motion to Dismiss at 6, 9, White v. Hesse, No. 5:19-cv-01145 (W.D. Okla. filed Jan. 22, 2020).
(W.D. Okla filed Dec. 10, 2019),
4 Court Docket, White v. Hesse, No. 5:19-cv-01145
00 05 9000
[https://perma.cc/M4H9.pdf.
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-OKSQN7].
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jurisdictions. The note will also outline the arguments the plaintiffs could
raise on the merits, limited by the available facts at this early stage in the
briefing. As much as possible, the note will hope to frame these arguments
around a social model of disability.
Part II of this note will provide background by reviewing the facts
and procedural history in White and by placing those facts in a broader
context framed by the social model of disability. This part will highlight
aspects of the Complaint that reveal White's and Musgrave's lived experiences as persons with disabilities and their sense of what would have
helped them in the bail proceedings. This attempt at disability legal studies
recognizes that, while in-person interviews may not be necessary, legal
arguments about persons with disabilities should not be made without their
meaningful participation.
Part III will analyze and reject the 26th Judicial District's defenses
raised in its Motion to Dismiss. First, regardless of Oklahoma law, the
ADA itself provides the legal basis for suing the district because the district is a public entity under Title II. Though the plaintiffs in White allocate
only one sentence to Jaegly v. Lucas County Board of Commissioners,5
the case offers an argument that is replicable in other jurisdictions. Second,
the district had a duty to recognize and make accommodations for the
plaintiffs because of the elevated likelihood that individuals with disabilities would come before bail proceedings. 6 McCadden by McCadden v.
City of Flint,7 which the plaintiffs relegate to a citation, offers better support than Piercev. Districtof Columbia' because it does not turn on obvious disabilities.
Part IV will assess the plausibility of plaintiffs' discrimination
claims, taking the factual allegations as true. First, White and Musgrave
have alleged that they are individuals with disabilities because interstitial
cystitis, anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress
disorder are physical and mental impairments that substantially limit major life activities, including concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and the major bodily functions of the bladder.9 Second,
White and Musgrave have alleged that they are qualified individuals with
a disability because the bail proceedings are a service, program, or activity
for which White and Musgrave meet the essential eligibility requirements
as arrested members of the public. 10 Third, the 26th Judicial District did
not ensure effective communication with White and Musgrave because the
district did not furnish appropriate auxiliary aids or services to allow White
and Musgrave to understand their initial appearance or arraignments. In
5 Jaegly v. Lucas County Board of Commissioners (Jaegly II), No. 16-cv-1982, 2017 WL
6042237 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2017).
6 McCadden by McCadden v. City of Flint, No. 18-12377, 2019 WL 1584548 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
Id.
8 Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F. Supp. 3d 250 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2015).
9 Complaint, supra note 1, at 7, 8.
0

Id.
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doing so, the district discriminated by denying White and Musgrave the
opportunity to participate in or benefit from these proceedings. The district's failure to make reasonable modifications in its procedures further
amounted to discrimination. The district likely cannot make out a defense
that a modification to its bail proceedings would be a fundamental alteration. Finally, because White and Musgrave should succeed on their claims,
a permanent injunction requiring the adoption of modified procedures is
an appropriate remedy under Title II.
Part V will conclude by encouraging other litigants to bring cases
similar to White.

I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Facts and Procedural History in White

Plaintiffs Misty White and Janara Musgrave are residents of Canadian County, Oklahoma." White is forty years old and a member of the
Cherokee Nation.' 2 She alleges that her impairments include severe depression, severe anxiety, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,
and interstitial cystitis.' 3 Musgrave is forty-seven and white."' She alleges
that her impairments include bipolar disorder I, anxiety disorder, and

PTSD.Y
Police arrested Musgrave on November 11, 2019, for the misdemeanor offenses of unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, knowingly receiving
6
stolen property, and larceny of property.1 Police arrested White on No7
vember 16, 2019, for violation of a Victim Protective Order.' After the
18
arrests, officers took White and Musgrave to the Canadian County Jail.
White did not receive her medications at the jail, despite her request, and
19
she began to suffer withdrawal symptoms.
On November 17, 2019, the day after her arrest, White had her initial

"

Id.
Id. at 7.
"3 Id. at 7.
'"
Id. at 8.
15
Id.
16 Id. at 16.
17 Id. at 12. In Oklahoma, violation of a Victim Protective Order is a misdemeanor. See OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, § 60.6 (2020).
18 Complaint, supranote 1, at 12, 16.
19 Id. at 12.
12
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appearance, a video conference that lasted about one minute. 20 The judge
told White the charges and set her bail at $3,500, which White could not
afford. 2 1 Because withdrawal symptoms from not receiving her medications gave White insomnia and a headache, it was "difficult for her to understand what was happening or to advocate for herself' during the proceeding. 22 White alleges that she "felt intimidated," "did not know the
rules," "did not know whether she could ask any questions," and "would
have liked to have [had] a lawyer present at the proceeding because it felt
one-sided." 2
On November 18, 2019, one week after her arrest, Musgrave had her
arraignment, a video conference that lasted between three and five
minutes. 24 For the first time, the judge informed Musgrave of the charges
and set her bail at $4,000, which she could not afford.25 Musgrave alleges
that she "had difficulty hearing and understanding what the judge was saying" because of her disabilities. 26 A jail officer sat directly behind Musgrave, which made her "anxious and distracted."" Musgrave could not
hear well because the phone volume was low, and the door was open. 28
She believes that "[i]f she had felt less rushed, she could have calmed
down and asked the judge a question." 29 Musgrave did not know whether
she could ask questions or if she had a right to a lawyer. 30 Musgrave further
alleges that "[t]here was no opportunity for [her] to obtain modifications
or accommodations to participate in the proceeding." 31
On November 26, 2019, nine days after her initial appearance, White
had her arraignment, another video conference of about one minute with
the same judge as before.32 At the proceeding, White was still suffering
withdrawal symptoms from not receiving her medications. 33 White did not
have a lawyer with her at the arraignment.34
On December 10, 2019, the plaintiffs filed their Class Action Complaint against the 26th Judicial District and five judges in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.3 5 On January 22,
20

Id. at 13.

21 Id. at 13. White later received a charge of Obstructing an Officer and had her bail increased to
$4,500. Id.
2
Id. at 13
23

Id.

Id. at 16, 17. Although the Complaint does not directly state as much, it appears that Musgrave
did not have an initial appearance separate from her arraignment. Id. at 16.
24
25

Id. at 16.

26

Id.
Id.

27

28

Id. at 16-17.

Id. at 17.
30 Id. at 17.
3' Id. at 16.
29

32

Id. at 13.

"

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 1.

3
3
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2020, the 26th Judicial District and the judges each filed a Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support. 36 The judicial district argued that Oklahoma
law does not allow lawsuits against judicial districts and that White and
Musgrave failed to state a claim because they did not allege that the district
37
denied them any requested accommodation. On February 12, 2020, the
plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Motions to Dismiss against the district and
the judges. 38 On February 19, 2020, the judicial district and the judges each
39
filed a Reply to Response to Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support. At
the time of writing this case remains pending before Judge Jodi W. Dishman. 4 0

B.

Social Model of Disability

Although this note primarily concerns White and Musgrave's legal
arguments under the Americans with Disabilities Act, a brief review of
theory will help to frame their claims.
As much as possible, this note seeks to adopt a social model of disability. Until the disability rights movement and, more recently, disability
legal studies, the prevailing view on disability adopted a medical model in
41
which persons with disabilities were denied agency. This model presumed that disability was the consequence of diagnosis; a person experi42
enced disability because that person was problematic in some way. The
difficulty of disability was one for the person to overcome, not for society
to address. 43 Insofar as society served people with disabilities, society protected them by placing them in institutions.4 Under a social model of disability, structures in society-not problems with the person-disable because barriers, not diagnoses, cause a person to experience an impairment
as a disability.45 As a consequence, the burden to rectify injustices is on
Motion to Dismiss, supranote 3, at 1.
Id. at 6-7, 9.
31 Plantiff's Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss 1, White v. Hesse, No. 5:19-cv-01145 (W.D. Okla. Feb.
12, 2020).
Reply to Response to Mot. to Dismiss 1, White v. Hesse, No. 5:19-cv-01145 (W.D. Okla. Feb.
3
19, 2020).
40 Court Docket, supra note 4, at 15.
41 See, Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What's DisabilityStudies Got to Do with It or an Introduction
to DisabilityLegal Studies, 42 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 403, 410-16 (2011) (contrasting disability
legal studies with studies of or about disability).
42
Id. at 419.
43 Id. at 419-20.
44 Id. at 420.
4 Id. at 426-27. For another helpful explanation, though using slightly different terminology, see
Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd w. Matson, The Disabledand the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 809,
814 (1966) ("For the most part it is the cultural definition of disability, rather than the scientific or
medical definition, which is instrumental in the ascription of capacities and incapacities, roles and
rights, status and security. Thus, a meaningful distinction may be made between 'disability' and
3
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society, not on the person.41 Additionally, a minority rights model shares
a premise with a social model in that it sees society as disabling. 47 Drawing
from the experiences of the Civil Rights and Women's Rights Movements,
the minority rights model nonetheless places the onus for liberation on the

collective will of people with disabilities. 48
White and Musgrave allege that they did not fully understand their
initial appearance and arraignments.4 9 A medical model would blame
White and Musgrave themselves for their inabilities. A social model
properly recognizes that White's and Musgrave's lack of understanding
was not the fault of their impairments but the consequence of an inaccessible proceeding. After all, White and Musgrave likely could have understood the proceeding with reasonable modifications. 50 On the other hand,
a minority rights model does not resolve this situation in particular. White
and Musgrave did not advocate for themselves in this situation because
they did not know they could.51 More broadly, however, by joining as
plaintiffs and seeking to represent a class of persons with disabilities,
White and Musgrave are taking the steps advocated by the minority rights
model-collective mobilization and concrete action through political and
legal channels.
Importantly, a social model would do more than blame the 26th Judicial District's proceedings for being 'disabling, not White's and Musgrave's impairments. A social model would also place White's and Musgrave's experiences as persons with disabilities at the forefront of any
consideration of their situation. 2 Without insights from White and Musgrave, any legal response would ultimately treat them as "unfortunate, afflicted creatures," the very impression that the disability rights movement
has rightfully rejected.53 This note does not feature any interviews with
White, Musgrave, or other individuals with disabilities involved in bail
proceedings. Fortunately, however, the Complaint includes not just

'handicap'-that is, between the physical disability, measured in objective scientific terms and the
social handicap imposed upon the disabled by the cultural definition of their estate.").
4 Kanter, supranote 41, at 427.
47 Id. at 420-21.
48 Id. at 422.
49 Complaint, supra note I, at 13,
16.
50 At this stage, the note sets out theoretical positions. The claim that the social model of disability
would place the onus on the 26th Judicial District to make modifications to its bail, arraignment, and
other proceedings does not mean that the plaintiffs have a claim under the ADA. The ADA incorporates some concepts from the social model, but the legal analysis must of course follow from the
statutory, regulatory, and judicial text, not theoretical principles.
" See also Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F. Supp. 3d 250, 269-270 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2015)
(calling "baffling" the contention that an inmate with known communications-related difficulties had
to communicate his own need for accommodations).
5
For an example of disability legal studies that highlights the lived experiences of persons with
disabilities, see JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: DISABIuTY OPPRESSION
AND EMPOWERMENT 12-17 (2000) (interviewing disability advocates).

" Pierce, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 265, (quoting Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 413, 426-27 (1991)).
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allegations of how White and Musgrave were treated by the judicial district, but also statements of how White and Musgrave experienced the
treatment they received and what White and Musgrave believe would have

helped them.
For example, the 26th Judicial District's procedures at White's initial
appearance left her feeling "intimidated."" White "would have liked" to
have had a lawyer with her.55 Furthermore, the withdrawal symptoms she
experienced at the proceeding came after she had tried advocating for her56
self at the Canadian County Jail by asking for her medication. For her
part, Musgrave alleges that she felt "anxious and distracted" because a jail
57
officer sat directly behind her during the proceeding. If she had not been
58
rushed, Musgrave "could have calmed down" and asked questions. She
59
also "would have liked" a lawyer. Additionally, Musgrave believes she
could have heard better if the video conference's volume was higher and
the door was closed.60
Affirming that White's and Musgrave's experiences and wishes
would belong properly at the forefront of any analysis, this note turns to
the specific arguments raised by the judicial district.

II.

THE 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DIsMISS

A.

Under Jaegly, Title H provides statutory authority to bring
claims against judicial districts, even if state law does not
explicitly authorize such actions

In its Motion to Dismiss, the 26th Judicial District maintains that it
cannot be sued because Oklahoma law does not authorize suits against its
judicial districts. 6' The district argues that the Oklahoma Governmental
Tort Claim Act governs lawsuits against the state and its political subdivisions and that this act's definition of "political subdivision" does not reach
judicial districts. 62 In their Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiffs

'

s5
56

57
Ss
59

*
61
62

Complaint, supra note 1, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 6-7.
Id. at 7 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152(13), 153 (2020)).
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devote six pages to contesting the 26th Judicial District's reading of Oklahoma law. 63 In the second to last sentence of this section, the plaintiffs turn
to Jaegly: "Moreover, considering Title II of the ADA specifically, the
Ohio District Court found that the Act itself provided the statutory authority to sue a local court."" Because Jaegly persuasively defeats the Motion
to Dismiss and because it offers a more replicable argument for potential
plaintiffs in other jurisdictions, this section will develop this argument beyond the one sentence that it has received so far in the White briefing. 65
In Jaegly, the plaintiff, whose impairments included agoraphobia,
panic disorder, and anxiety, had difficulty interacting with others, being in
public places, and leaving his home. 66 In three separate proceedings, Jeffrey Jaegly sought a divorce in Ohio's Lucas County Court of Common
Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. 67 In the first proceeding, Jaegly had
to pay for a court reporter and video technology to remain at home on
account of his disability. 68 In the second proceeding, the court allowed
Jaegly to participate in the initial hearing by telephone but rejected his
request for this accommodation at all hearings. 69 According to Jaegly, the
court did not consider other options to accommodate his disability. 70 The
court dismissed the divorce action after Jaegly did not appear for a settlement pre-trial conference.7 1 Finally, in his third attempt, the court again
denied Jaegly's Motion to Excuse Plaintiff's Presence at All Hearings. 72
Jaegly filed a complaint under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
against multiple defendants, including the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Divisions, in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio. 73 Among other claims, Jaegly alleged that the defendants "refused to make reasonable modifications to
general practices [and] refused to provide auxiliary aids and services."7 4
The Court of Common Pleas filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
it was not a legal entity capable of being sued. 75 The Court of Common
Pleas argued that state law controlled whether it was an entity capable of
being sued under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) and that Ohio law

63

"
65

Plantiffs Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 38, at 2-8.
Id. at 8.
Additionally, the district's Reply makes no mention of Jaegly. See, Kanter, supra note 41 at 1-

3.
" Jaegly v. Lucas Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs (Jaegly I), No. 16-cv-1982, 2017 WL 4310634, at *1
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2017), aff'd on alternative grounds by Jaegly II, No. 16-cv-1982, 2017 WL
6042237 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2017).
67
Id.
6 Id. This action was dismissed for independent reasons. Id.
69
Id.
*

Id.

73

Id.
Id. The district court ruled that collateral estoppel controlled this decision. Id.
Id. at *2.

74

Id.

75

Jaegly II, No. 16-cv-1982, 2017 WL 6042237, *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2017).

71
72

Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights

238

[Vol. 26:2

did not authorize suits against courts. 76 In support, it cited a Supreme Court
of Ohio decision that stated, "[a]bsent express statutory authority, a court
can neither sue nor be sued in its own right." 77 The Court of Common Pleas
then maintained that no Ohio statute gives "express statutory authority" to
sue an Ohio court. 78
The district court found "express statutory authority" in Title II of
the ADA itself.79 First, the district court determined that Ohio courts have
not uniformly resolved whether federal statutes may provide the "express
statutory authority." 80 Admittedly, the district court in Jaegly may have
reached a bit in concluding that Ohio courts had been uncertain in this
regard. In Lawson v. City of Youngstown, the district court clearly stated
that "the State of Ohio is the only entity capable of providing express authority for a court to be sued." 8 ' Nevertheless, the district court in Jaegly
82
found its support in Hatzidakis v. Lucas County Common Pleas Court,
even though the district court in that case merely considered-and ultimately rejected-the plaintiffs contention that federal law in Title VII
could provide "express statutory authority."83
Second, after claiming that Ohio courts were not uniform as to
whether federal law could provide "express statutory authority," the district court in Jaegly addressed the matter itself.84 The district court decided
85
for policy reasons that federal statutes could provide express authority.
Distinguishing Lawson, in which the plaintiff asserted claims under both
Ohio and federal law, the district court noted that Jaegly had only federal
claims available because Ohio lacked any statute similar to the ADA or
the Rehabilitation Act.86 The district court declared it "illogical to require
that an Ohio statute provide the authority to assert a right exclusively available under federal law."8 7 The district court also found support in the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Lane, which characterized Title II
as "aimed at the enforcement of a variety of basic rights, including the
right of access to the courts." 88 After all, Congress intended the ADA to
address "unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons by state agen-

cies."89

77
78

Id.; See also FED. R. CIv. P. 17(b).
Jaegly II, 2017 WL 6042237, at *2.
Id.

79

Id.

80

Id.

76

Lawson v. City of Youngstown, 912 F. Supp. 2d 527, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
Hatzidakis v. Lucas County Common Pleas Court, No. 3:1 1CV00169, 2013 WL 3243629 (N.D.
Ohio June 25, 2013).
83
Id. at *3.
8 Jaegly II, 2017 WL 6042237, at *2.
81

82

85

Id.

8

Id.
Id.
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004).
Id. at 510.

87
88

89
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Third, the district court considered whether the ADA provided "express statutory authority" and concluded that it did. 90 In PennsylvaniaDepartment of Correctionsv. Yeskey, a prison argued that it was not a "public
entity" for purposes of Title 11.91 The Supreme Court rejected this argument because Congress in the ADA clearly intended to cover state institutions, and no language in the text suggested an exception for prisons. 92 In
Jaegly, the district court applied the same reasoning and did not identify
any language in the text suggesting that Congress had meant to exempt
courts from the ADA.93 As the Court reasoned in Yeskey, that the ADA
can be "applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does

not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."94
In White, the district court should follow Jaegly. Although Oklahoma
has state anti-discrimination laws that are like Titles I and III in prohibiting
discrimination by employers and public accommodations,95 the state does
not have an analog to Title II. As in Jaegly, it would be "illogical" to require Oklahoma law to allow plaintiffs to assert an exclusively federal
claim. 96 Beyond Oklahoma law, Yeskey makes clear that absent a clear
exception, "public entity" in Title II encompasses even those state instrumentalities that Congress might not have specifically envisioned, whether
prisons or courts. 97 Lane further demonstrates that the ADA protects the
fundamental right of access to courts.98
Litigants should develop arguments based on Jaegly for different jurisdictions. The exact steps in Jaegly required the district court to cite Ohio
cases. 99 More broadly, Jaegly persuasively combined Yeskey, Lane, and
the policy argument that states should not get to limit the public entities to
which Title II applies; this argument does not turn on specific state law. 100
Regardless, the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss notes that many states do
allow these lawsuits. 101

"
9'

92

Jaegly II, 2017 WL 6042237, at *2.
Penn. Dept of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998).
Id.at211-12.

93 Jaegly II, 2017 WL 6042237, at *3.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212.
95
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, §§ 1302, 1402 (discriminatory practices by employers and by public
accommodations, respectively).
4 Jaegly I, No. 16-cv-1982, 2017 WL 4310634, *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2017).
"7 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211-12.
9
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004).
99 Jaegly II, No. 16-cv-1982, 2017 WL 6042237, *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2017).
10 One court, also in Ohio, has cited Jaegly in denying a court system's Motion to Dismiss involving a claim arising under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bowie v. Hamilton Cnty.
Juv. Ct., No.: 1:18-cv-395, 2019 WL 1305864, at 2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2019).
101 Plantiff's Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, supranote 38, at 2.
94
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Under McCadden, judicial districts must adopt policies to
provide reasonable modifications because of the elevated
likelihood their officers will interact with individuals with

disabilities in bail, arraignment, and other proceedings
In its Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support, the 26th Judicial District argues that White and Musgrave have failed to state a claim because
they do not allege that the district court ever denied a requested modification.10 2 In its Reply to Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support, the 26th
Judicial District elaborates that "knowledge by the party being sued of a
disability (that may or may not need an accommodation) and a request for
accommodation" are essential elements for the plaintiff's claim under the

ADA. 103

In their Brief in Opposition, White and Musgrave counter that the
ADA imposes affirmative obligations on public entities even without notice. 104 The plaintiffs cite multiple regulations, including-as relevant for
this note's argument-that a "public entity shall take appropriate steps to
ensure that communications with [people] with disabilities are as effective
05
as communications with others."1 The plaintiffs buttress this claim with
cases interpreting the regulations.' 06 In particular, White and Musgrave
rely on Pierce to discredit the 26th Judicial District's argument that its
"obligations under the ADA and Section 504 depend on notification of a
07
person's disability or request for accommodation."1
The plaintiffs' reliance on Pierce may be overstated. Though language in Pierce supports the proposition that public entities have an affinnative duty to ascertain whether a person has a disability and needs a
modification,1 08 the holding in Pierceis more limited. As the district court
specified, "this Court holds that the failure of prison staff to conduct an
informed assessment of the abilities and accommodation needs of a new
inmate who is obviously disabled . .. violates Section 504 and Title II as
a matter of law."109 In White, the plaintiffs' disabilities are likely not so
102 Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 9.
03 Reply to Response to Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 5.

Plantiff's Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, supranote 38, at 9.
28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1).
10 Plantiff's Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 38 at 18 ("Courts have repeatedly underscored the affirmative steps that the ADA requires to ensure that disabled people have equal access.");
see, e.g., Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002) ("A plain reading of the
ADA evidences that Congress intended to impose an affirmative duty on public entities to create policies or procedures to prevent discrimination based on disability.").
107 Plantiff's Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, supranote 38, at 12 (citing Pierce, 128 F. Supp. 3d at
266-69).
108 Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F. Supp. 3d250,267 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2015) ("The Court ...
finds that the District violated Section 504 and Title II as a matter of law when it failed to evaluate
Pierce's need for accommodation at the time he was taken into custody.").
Id. at 268. ("As explained below, this Court holds that the failure of prison staff to conduct an
'0
14

*
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obvious as Pierce's deafness. White's impairments are severe depression,
severe anxiety, bipolar disorder, PTSD, and interstitial cystitis.1 0 Musgrave's impairments are bipolar disorder I, anxiety disorder, and PTSD."I
White's and Musgrave's disabilities may not give notice.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs' string citation after quoting Pierce refers to
a case that offers support for White and Musgrave's argument that public
entities have an affirmative duty to accommodate disabilities and supports
similar future claims: McCadden." 2 The 26th Judicial District's best response to this case in its Reply to the Response to the Motion to Dismiss
is to discredit it as "a district court order from a court not in the Tenth
Circuit [that] has no control over this Court." 1 3 The district court's avoidance of the facts and reasoning in the case is telling: McCadden stands for
the proposition that an "elevated likelihood" that a public entity will interact with persons with disabilities requires the public entity to "take[] action
to address how officers [will] interact" with such individuals.1 4 Because
McCadden persuasively addresses the Motion to Dismiss and offers a
more replicable argument for future plaintiffs in other jurisdictions, this
section will develop the potential for a McCadden argument beyond its
use by the White plaintiffs.
In McCadden, a seven-year-old boy with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder experienced a behavior episode induced by his disability."1 5
Without inquiring whether the boy had a disability, the school resource
officer "immediately" handcuffed him.1 6 The boy's parent filed suit
against the city under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
among other claims." 7 Included within the ADA claim were allegations
informed assessment of the abilities and accommodation needs of a new inmate who is obviously
disabled is intentional discrimination in the form of deliberate indifference and violates Section 504
and Title II as a matter of law.")
10 Complaint, supra note 1, at 7. ("Ms. White has severe depression, severe anxiety, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder ('PTSD'), and a painful condition called interstitial cystitis.")
"' Id. at 8. ("[Plaintiff Janara Musgrave] has bipolar disorder I, anxiety disorder, and PTSD.").
"2 Plantiff's Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 38 at 9; See also McCadden by McCadden
v. City of Flint, No. 18-12377, 2019 WL 1584548, *7 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
"3 Reply to Response to Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 6 ("Obviously, this case is a district
court order from a court not in the Tenth Circuit and has no control over this Court (unlike the Tenth

Circuit cases cited that do set forth the elements of the claims and require knowledge of the disability
and a request for accommodation under both Title II of the ADA and the Rehab Act).").
"4 McCadden, 2019 WL 1584548, at *7 (reasoning that "although the City, Johnson, and Walker
are not alleged to have known about Plaintiff's disability, Plaintiff has alleged that the City knew or
should have know[n] about the elevated likelihood that any Flint juveniles would suffer from a disability and should have taken action to address how officers interact with Flint juveniles."). The parties
in McCadden reached a settlement in August 2020. See Sarah Cwiek, Lawsuit over Seven-Year-Old
Handcuffed by Flint Police Settled, MICH. RADIO (Aug. 19, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/y8fk5jps
[https://perma.cc/S2MS-7GSF].
"1 McCadden, 2019 WL 1584548, at *1.
116 Id. ("Walker did not inquire whether Plaintiff had a disability or an individualized education plan
('IEP'), and Walker immediately placed Plaintiff in handcuffs.").
"7 Id. ("Plaintiff's Complaint includes five claims in which Johnson or the City are sued: (1) a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendant Police Chief Timothy Johnson ("Johnson") for unreasonable
search and seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
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that the city discriminated by "failing to provide reasonable modifications
to policies, practices, or procedures to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability," "failing to ensure policies, practices, procedures, training, or
supervision that take the needs of children with disabilities into account,"
and "failing to avoid unnecessary policies, practices, criteria or methods
of administration that have the effect of discriminating against persons
with disabilities.""'8 In addition, McCadden argued that "compliance with
Title II requires that public entities: (1) cease engagement in negative acts
of disability discrimination, and (2) take certain affirmative steps to ensure
that disabled individuals are not subjected to disability discrimination.""19
20
The city filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the district court denied.1
Most importantly for the White plaintiffs, the district court disregarded the
fact that the city is "not alleged to have known about Plaintiff's disability,
[because] Plaintiff has alleged that the City knew or should have to know
[sic] about the elevated likelihood that any Flint juveniles would suffer
from a disability and should have taken action to address how officers interact with Flint juveniles."121
In White, the plaintiffs have alleged that the 26th Judicial District
Court knew or should have known about the "elevated likelihood" that
individuals with disabilities would come before its bail, arraignment, or
other proceedings. First, the plaintiffs present data showing that "60 percent of those imprisoned in Oklahoma [17,000] have symptoms or a history of mental illness."1 22 Second, the plaintiffs quoted an Oklahoma
County District Attorney saying that Oklahomans with mental illnesses
"are coming into the criminal justice system at a rate that is just completely
overwhelming."1 23 Similar numbers exist elsewhere, meaning that the "elevated likelihood" that individuals with disabilities will appear in a bail
2
proceeding is not limited to Oklahoma." For this reason, litigants from
other jurisdictions should rely on McCadden in future cases.

U.S. Constitution (Count 1); (2) a Monell liability claim against the City (Count II); (3) a claim against
the City for disability-based discrimination in violation of Title II of the ADA (Count III); (4) a claim
for disability-based discrimination by the City for violating Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(Count IV 1); and (5) disability-based discrimination by the City in violation of Michigan's Persons
with Disabilities Civil Rights Act ("PWDCRA") (Count V).").
"8 Id. at *5.
19 Id. at *7.
120 Id.
12

Id.

Plantiff's Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 38 at 15, (citing Jaclyn Cosgrove, Epidemic
Ignored, OKLAHOMAN (Nov. 13, 2016), http://oklahoman.com/speciaL/article/5526388/epidemic-ignored-solutions-necessary-to-stop-oklahomans-from-funneling-into-jails-prisons-for-treatment
[https://perma.cc/E99C-GZ4F]).
123 Id.
124 John P. Docherty, CreatingNew Hopefor MentalIllness and the CriminalJusticeSystem, NAMI
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nami.org/Blogs/NAMI-Blog/October-2017/Creating-New-Hope-forMental-Illness-and-the-Crimi [https://perma.cc/TZ8Q-QTSB] ("In 44 out of 50 states, prisons and
jails hold more individuals with serious mental illness than the largest state hospital. In local jails, 64%
of people experience symptoms of a mental health condition, which represents over 7 million people.").
122
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For the above reasons, the 26th Judicial District can be sued under
Title II and should have known that individuals with disabilities would
come before it in bail proceedings. The next part will consider the plaintiffs' arguments directly. Analysis of White and Musgrave's claims on the
merits is not wholly separate from the 26th Judicial District's Motion to
Dismiss. If their factual allegations, taken as true, do not make out plausible grounds on which they might prevail on the merits, that failure would
be a reason for the district court to grant the Motion to Dismiss. 12 1

III. WHITE AND MUSGRAVE'S CLAIMS UNDER THE ADA TITLE II
AND REHABILITATION ACT

Because the 26th Judicial District is a "public entity,"1 2 6 Title II of
the ADA determines whether the district discriminated against White and
Musgrave on the basis of disability. 127
Title II's non-discrimination provision states:
No qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 2 8
The analysis requires answering two preliminary questions: whether
White and Musgrave are "individual[s] with a disability" and whether they
are "qualified." The third question then becomes whether the 26th Judicial District "subjected [them] to discrimination." Finally, if the answers
are yes to the above, the fourth question concerns the available remedies.

A.

White and Musgrave have alleged that they are
individuals with a disability

The Complaint states that White and Musgrave are "individuals with
disabilities for purposes of' the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act.1 29 Because the Complaint does not walk through each
step of the necessary analysis, this section will demonstrate that White and

See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
126 See infra Part III.A.
12' Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2009). The Rehabilitation Act applies to any entity that receives federal funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Complaint alleges that "[u]pon
information and belief," the 26th Judicial District receives federal funds. Complaint, supra note 1, at
48.
128 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Rehabilitation Act uses a similar prohibition. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 794.
129 Complaint, supra note 1, at 7-8,
47-48.
12
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Musgrave are in fact individuals with disabilities.
The Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 defines
"disability" as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such an individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

0

Before these amendments, cases often hinged on whether a plaintiff
31
was an "individual with a disability."' In the 2008 amendments Congress
affirmed its intent "that the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis." 132Nevertheless, the prong for the actually disabled retains three terms
that require analysis: "physical or mental impairment," "major life activities," and "substantially limits."
By congressional authority, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) promulgated regulations interpreting the definition
33
Under the EEOC regulations, a
of "physical or mental impairment."
"physical or mental impairment" includes "[a]ny physiological disorder,
or condition, .. . affecting one or more body systems, such as: . . . gemtourinary." 13 4 A "physical or mental impairment" also includes "[a]ny men35
tal or psychological disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illness."'
The statute also excludes various traits from "mental impairment," such as
"compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania."136

The ADA statute enumerates activities that qualify as "major life activities."1 37 These include "hearing," "concentrating," and the "operation
3
of major bodily functions," including "functions of the . .. bladder."l t Because the text states that "major life activities" "are not limited to" those
listed, the EEOC has included other activities by regulation, such as
39
"thinking, communicating, and interacting with others."
The statute directs that "the term 'substantially limits' shall be
130

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The Rehabilitation Act mostly uses the same definition. See 29 U.S.C.
(referencing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 definition).

§ 705(9)(B)
131

See RUTH COLKER & PAUL D. GROSSMAN, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 20 (8th

ed. 2013) (noting that the previous definition caused the "vast majority of disability discrimination
claims filed in federal court [to] fail[] to survive a motion for summary judgment").
132 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553(b)(5) (2008).
3 42 U.S.C. § 12205a.
14 Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1991).
135 Id.

136 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a)(2).
13 See Id. § 12102(2)(A)-(B).
Id.
139 29 C.F.R.
138

§

1630.2(i)(1)(i).
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interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008."1140 In the Findings Section, Congress stated
that earlier Supreme Court interpretation of the term required a "greater
degree of limitation than was intended by Congress" and that earlier regulation "defining the term 'substantially limits' as 'significantly restricted'
[we]re inconsistent with congressional intent, by expressing too high a
standard.""' In its Purposes Section, Congress stated that it intended "to
convey congressional intent that the [earlier] standard . .. for 'substantially limits' ... has created an inappropriately high level of limitation
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA." 14 2 In its "Rules of Construction," the EEOC maintains that the "determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment." 143 Nevertheless, the EEOC also recognizes that for some
impairments, the "necessary individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward."14 4 The EEOC includes as predictable
"major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, [and] post-traumatic stress
disorder."14 5 Finally, the ADA clarifies that the "determination of whether
an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as ...
[m]edication."1 4 6
In White, White and Musgrave are individuals with a disability because they allege physical or mental impairments that substantially limit
one or more of their major life activities. First, White and Musgrave allege
multiple physical or mental impairments. White alleges that she has interstitial cystitis, a physiological condition affecting the genitourinary system. 4 7 White and Musgrave also allege psychological disorders, including
depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. 148
Second, White and Musgrave allege that their impairments affect
major life activities. Interstitial cystitis affects the major bodily function
of the bladder. Their psychological disorders affect concentrating, a major
life activity by statute, as well as thinking, communicating, and interacting
with others, which are major life activities by regulation.1 49 Moreover, the
impairments affected White and Musgrave in their proceedings. At her initial proceeding, White alleges that it was "difficult for her to understand
what was happening" because of insomnia and a headache, symptoms of

4

42 U.S.C.

§

12102(4)(B).

4 ADA Amendments Act
142 Id.

§ 2.

1 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv)
1- Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (1991).
145 Id.
'4

4

42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I)

Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.

48 Id. at 8.
"4

See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(2)(A)-(B);

29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(i)(1)(i).
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1
withdrawal after not receiving her anxiety medication. 1 In addition, Musgrave alleges that at her arraignment, she "had difficulty 15. .. understanding
what the judge was saying during the arraignment." ' Musgrave also

stated that she "was anxious and distracted" because a jail officer sat be-

-

hind her during the proceeding.12
Third, White and Musgrave's impairments substantially limit these
major life activities for purposes of the ADA. In the amendments, Congress envisioned that an effect on a major life activity that is not a "significant restriction" may still qualify as a "substantial limitation."" Under
the new approach, White's and Musgrave's claims should be sufficient for
this low hurdle. Moreover, the psychological impairments that White5and
4
and PTSD'
Musgrave allege-including depression, bipolar disorder,
55
fall within the EEOC's predictable assessments.1 Finally, the increased

anxiety and withdrawal symptoms that White experienced after being de-

nied her medication are substantially limiting, even if they would stop with

medication, because courts do not consider the ameliorative effects of mit-

igating measures.
In the Complaint, Musgrave alleges that she had difficulty hearing
56
With reand understanding her arraignment because of her disabilities.
spect to hearing, the Complaint might go too far, even for the reduced
"substantial limitation" hurdle in the amended ADA. The impairments that
Musgrave alleges are psychological; she does not allege a hearing impair15
ment, whether physical or neurological. 1 Even though hearing is a major
58
life activity by statute, her impairments likely do not substantially limit
her hearing. Musgrave herself stated that she could have heard better had
the volume been raised and the door closed.' In contrast, Musgrave's allegation about not understanding is likely sufficient for showing that her
impairments substantially limited her concentrating, thinking, communicating, and interacting with others.
For the above reasons, White and Musgrave are individuals with disabilities. Because White and Musgrave are actually disabled within the

meaning of the ADA, the second and third prongs of the definition of

"
"5'
152

Complaint, supra note 1 at 13.
Id. at 16.

Id.

13 See ADA Amendments Act § 2.
"5 Complaint, supra note 1, at 12, 16.
".. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)
"6 Complaint, supranote 1, at 16.
"? Id.
" 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
not count
"s9 Complaint, supra note 1, at 17. Raising the volume and closing the door likely would
proentity's
public
the
to
accommodations"
"reasonable
were
they
unless
measures,"
as "mitigating
ceedings. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(III). If these were reasonable accommodations, then their
ameliorative effects would not mean that the effect of Musgrave's impairments on hearing were not
substantial. However, it remains that her impairments may not have had any effect on her hearing, and
she had difficulty hearing for separate reasons.

2021 ]

White v. Hesse

247

"disability" do not require analysis. 160 Congress has stated that its purpose
in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 was to ensure that "the primary
object of attention in cases brought under the ADA [was] whether entities
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations." 161 The note
now turns to Title II to complete these steps in the analysis.

B.

White and Musgrave have alleged that they are qualified

for the 26th Judicial District's arraignment and bail
proceedings

Being an "individual with a disability" is insufficient for making out
a claim under the ADA. The second preliminary question is whether that
individual is "qualified." Because the Complaint does not walk through
the requisite analysis, this part will.

Under Title II of the ADA, a "qualified" person is:
[A]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of
architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.162
This definition requires determining whether a public entity's offering is a "service[] . . . program[] or activit[y]" and whether the individual
meets the "essential eligibility requirements." 163
A public entity's services, programs, and activities include anything
with an individual's involvement, even if not voluntary or not beneficial
as might be "ordinarily understood."1" In Pennsylvania Department of
Correctionsv. Yeskey, the Supreme Court rejected the prison's two arguments that it did not provide services, programs, or activities for purposes
of the ADA. First, the Court rejected the argument that prisons do not provide inmates with "benefits" as might be "ordinarily understood."' 6 5 After

&

60 These prongs cover individuals who were actually disabled in the past but no longer meet the
statutory definition and individuals who are falsely regarded as being disabled. See COLKER
GROSSMAN supra note 131, at 172.
161 See ADA Amendments
Act § 2..
162 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). The Rehabilitation Act's similar term, "otherwise
qualified," involves two
questions: the "essential attributes" of performing a function and whether the person can meet the
"requirements."
163 Id.
169 See Penn. Dept of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1998); Galloway v. Superior Ct. of
D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12, 14, 18, 20 (D.D.C. 1993). By statute, the Rehabilitation Act defines "program
or activity" as "all of the operations of.. . a department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or of a local government." 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A).
165 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210.
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all, the Court observed that prisons offer multiple services, programs, or
166
Second,
activities that "at least theoretically 'benefit' the prisoners."
167
involunif
Even
voluntary.
be
not
need
services, programs, or activities
tary, judicial proceedings are services, programs, or activities under Title
II because, in Yeskey's terms, they at least theoretically benefit the person
involved. For example, in Galloway v. Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, the jury system was a service, program, or activity, even though
a jury summons is mandatory and jury duty's benefit to the juror is only
68
an intangible "honor and privilege." Indeed, the district court considered
it "obvious" that the jury system fell within Title 11.169
Given that Title II applies to public entities and Title I applies to employment, the thrust of the "essential eligibility requirements" component
under Title II is considerably less than the "essential functions" aspect of
Title 1.170 In Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Supreme Court announced that, under Title I, courts could defer to employers' qualification
standards, even when they were stricter than applicable laws or regulations. 171 In contrast, for many of a public entity's services, programs, or
activities, the only eligibility requirement may be membership in the general public. In the case of an arrested member of the public, their participation in subsequent involuntary procedures will not make a proceeding
172
any less of a service, program, or activity in terms of the ADA.
73
Title II of the ADA does not include a "direct threat" defense.1
However, the Department of Justice's regulations allow that a "public entity may impose legitimate safety requirements necessary for the safe op174
Safety requirements
eration of its services, programs, or activities."
must be "based on actual risks, not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or
17 5
generalizations about individuals with disabilities." An actual risk could
include a "direct threat," a "significant risk to the health or safety of others
17 6
that cannot be eliminated."
In White, the 26th Judicial District's arraignment and bail proceedings are services, programs, or activities for the purposes of Title II. Under
Oklahoma law, an arraignment is a mandatory practice for the reading of
17 7
That the 26th Judicial
the indictment or information to a defendant.

16

Id.

167 Id. at 211.
" Galloway, 816 F. Supp. at 14, 20 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991)).
169 Id. at 18.

§§ 12111(8), 12131(2).
171 Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555,558 (1999), supersededby statute,ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325.
172 See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211.
COLKER & GROSSMAN supra note 131, at 172.
"
174 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(h).
170 See 42 U.S.C.

175

Id.

176 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.104.
177 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 451, 465 (2020). For purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, an arraignment
is certainly an "operation" of a state instrumentality. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A).
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District held White and Musgrave in the Canadian County Jail, and they
did not voluntarily choose to participate in the proceedings, does not make
those procedures any less of a service, program, or activity, as the Supreme
Court ruled in Yeskey. 178 In addition, Oklahoma law generally provides
that "bail, by sufficient sureties, shall be admitted upon all arrests where
the offense is not punishable by death." 17 9 The bail proceedings "at least
theoretically" could have benefited White and Musgrave if they had been
able to make bail in exchange for release. 180 If a juror can be said to benefit
from the "honor and privilege" a jury system provides, then a bail system
in which a defendant can receive a release from custody also provides a
benefit. 181
White and Musgrave meet the "essential eligibility criteria" for the
arraignment and bail proceedings. First, even though White and Musgrave's charges are misdemeanors, such that Oklahoma law did not require their appearances at the arraignments, 8 2 they were eligible to appear.
Second, the 26th Judicial District's bail schedule applies to anyone arrested for a felony or misdemeanor. 183 Indeed, the 26th Judicial District
evidenced their belief that White and Musgrave were eligible by conducting the proceedings. Although White and Musgrave were not able to participate fully in the proceedings, their need for reasonable modifications
does not affect whether they were qualified but whether they experienced

discrimination. 184

Finally, the 26th Judicial District cannot make out a safety defense
to White and Musgrave's qualifications. The arraignment and bail proceedings took place by videoconference in the Canadian County Jail with
jail officers present.1 85 White and Musgrave did not pose a direct threat or
actual risk to anyone in these proceedings. 186 Moreover, a lawyer or other
reasonable modification for White and Musgrave would also not have
posed any actual risks.
Under Title II, White and Musgrave are qualified individuals with
disabilities for the 26th Judicial District's arraignment and bail proceedings. Following these preliminary questions, the issue becomes whether
the 26th Judicial District discriminated against White and Musgrave.

"8 See Penn. Dept of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998); Complaint, supra note 1, at 1213, 16.
19 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 1101(A). Bail "may be denied" for certain offenses more serious than
White and Musgrave's misdemeanors. Id. § 1101(C). Again, for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act,
bail is certainly an "operation" of a state instrumentality. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A).
180 See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210.
181 See Galloway v. Superior Ct. of D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12, 20 (D.D.C. 1993) (quoting Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991)).
182 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 452.
183 Complaint, supra note 1, at 21.
18
See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
18
See Complaint, supra note 1, at 13, 16.
86 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104.
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White and Musgrave have alleged that the 26th Judicial
District denied them the opportunity to participate in the

proceedings because the district did not ensure effective
communication by not furnishing appropriate auxiliary
aids and services and because doing so would not have
been a fundamental alteration

In the Complaint, White and Musgrave claim that the 26th Judicial

District is "violating Title II of the ADA by administering a bail policy
that does not take into consideration an individual's disability [and] does
not provide the modifications or effective communication services that the
person may need to participate equally in the initial appearance or arraignment proceedings." 187 This section will now walk through the necessary
steps in the analysis.
Title II's prohibition against discrimination mandates that a qualified
individual shall not, by reason of disability, "be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of
188
a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."
The Department of Justice's regulations elaborate on how a public entity

might engage in discrimination on the basis of disability, including by fail-

ing to communicate effectively.1 89
A public entity's duty to ensure effective communication is affinnative: "A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services
where necessary to afford individuals with disabilities ... an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or
activity of a public entity.""' A public entity that fails to furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary has discriminated by

"[d]eny[ing] a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service."191 Furthermore, a
public entity that discriminates by denying equality of opportunity must
"make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when

the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability." 192
As a defense, the regulations allow public entities to not make rea-

sonable

modifications

when

"making

the modifications

would

Complaint, supranote 1, at 47. The plaintiffs also state other claims under the ADA. Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
189 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 ("A public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications
with ... participants ... with disabilities are as effective as communications with others."). These
regulations were "[p]atterned to a considerable degree" on earlier regulations of the Rehabilitation
Act. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.4; COLKER & GROSsMAN supra note 131, at 211.
190 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1).
191 Id. § 35.130(b)(1)(i).
192 Id. § 35.130(b)(7).
187
188
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fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 193 A
fundamental alteration occurs when a change would unacceptably affect
an essential aspect of the service, program, or activity for all participants
or when a less significant change would give the individual with a disability an advantage over other participants.194 In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,1 95
the Supreme Court did not defer to the golf association's views on what
would fundamentally alter the association's own competitions.1 96 The
Court insisted that the "clear language and purpose of the ADA" require
an individualized inquiry.1 97 In dissent, Justice Scalia promoted a more
deferential approach to the golf association's "fundamental alteration" defense.1 98 However, Justice Scalia's criticism of the majority's approach
appears to depend more on his view of golf's purpose than on his view of
the ADA's purpose.1 99
In White, White and Musgrave have alleged that the 26th Judicial
District subjected them to discrimination because their communication
was not as effective as others', they did not receive any auxiliary aids or
services, and providing aids would not have been a fundamental alteration.
First, White and Musgrave have alleged that their communications during
the arraignment and bail proceedings were not as effective as others'.
White alleges that, in her initial appearance, she "had insomnia and a headache, which made it difficult for her to understand what was happening or
to advocate for herself." 2 0 0 Similarly, Musgrave alleges that, in her arraignment, she "had difficulty ... understanding what the judge was saying." 20 1 Their communications were not effective. The Complaint does not
directly compare White's and Musgrave's communications to others', but,
revealingly, the allegations of the other plaintiffs do not specifically allege
an inability to understand the proceedings. 202 This comparison provides
Id. Unlike Titles I and Ill, Title H does not offer a defense of undue hardship or burden.
194 See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 682-83 (2001).
195 Although the majority and the dissent disagreed in PGA Tour over whether Casey Martin's claim
arose under Title I or Title III of the ADA, Title II clearly did not apply because the golf association
is not a public entity. Compare 532 U.S. at 681 (golf club is a public accommodation under Title III),
with 532 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (professional golfer is an independent contractor who is
not covered by Title I). Nevertheless, the competing applications of the "fundamental alteration" defense in PGA Tour are helpful because this defense appears in the regulations for Title II and the
statute for Title III. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Title III statute), with 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(7) (Title II regulations); see also COLKER & GROSSMAN supranote 131, at 172 ("DOJ has
promulgated virtually identical regulations to interpret these terms under ADA Title 11 and Title
III....").
'9
PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 682-83.
197 Id. at 688.
198 Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But since it is the very nature of a game to have no object
except amusement (that is what distinguishes games from productive activity), it is quite impossible
to say that any of a game's arbitraryrules is 'essential.').
214 Complaint, supra note 1, at 13.
'9

201 Id. at 16.
202 Id. at 13. One plaintiff, when asked by the judge whether he understood
the proceedings, answered "yes and no." Id. at 19. This plaintiff then tried to ask questions about his charges and the bail,
which indicates that he understood more than White and Musgrave. Id.
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evidence that White's and Musgrave's communications were not as effective as others'.
Second, White and Musgrave have alleged that the 26th Judicial District did not furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services that would have
allowed them to communicate effectively in the proceedings. Both White
and Musgrave did have their proceedings conducted by video conference. 203 The furnishing of video conference does not mean, however, that
White and Musgrave received appropriate auxiliary aids and services.
First, quite simply, the video conference failed in providing effective communication, even if it was meant as an auxiliary aid. Second, auxiliary aids
and services require individualized assessment; a general practice of using
video conferences does not make it an auxiliary aid. As stated in the regulations, the "type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective
communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place." 204 Moreover, the regulations require a public entity to "give
primary consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities" in
"determining what types of auxiliary aids and services are necessary."205
Far from this, White and Musgrave instead had "no opportunity .. . to ob206
tain modifications or accommodations to participate in the proceeding."
Any argument from the 26th Judicial District that the video conference
was an appropriate auxiliary aid should fail. The district did not fulfill its

duty to ensure effective communication.
Third, because White and Musgrave have alleged that the 26th Judicial District did not ensure effective communication by furnishing appropriate auxiliary aids or services, White and Musgrave have stated a claim
that the district discriminated by denying them "the opportunity to partic20 7
This discrimination
ipate in or benefit from the aid, benefit or service."
means that the district must "make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures." 208
Fourth, the 26th Judicial District likely cannot demonstrate that
"making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 209 First, providing a modification would not
unacceptably change arraignment or bail proceedings for all participants.
Any individual at the arraignment or bail proceeding who does not need
the modification could simply ignore it. Second, because arraignments and
bail proceedings are not competitive, any individual who receives a

203

Id. at 13, 16.

204

28 C.F.R.

§ 35.160(b)(2).

205 Id.
206
207
200

Complaint, supranote 1, at 16.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i).
Id. § 35.130(b)(7).

209 Id.
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modification does not receive any advantage over another defendant. As
an example of how modifications in judicial proceedings are often not fundamental alterations, the district court in Galloway contemplated that "audio describers" as a reasonable modification for blind jurors would not
mark a fundamental alteration, just as sign language interpreters do not for
deafjurors. 210 Even Justice Scalia's more deferential approach to the "fundamental alteration" defense has less thrust in this case. 2 ' Judicial proceedings are not games; courts can assess fundamental alteration defenses

raised by defendant courts.

D.

Injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy under the ADA
Title II

Though the standards for compensatory or punitive damages under
Title II are unclear, 212 it is clear that injunctive relief is an available remedy. Title II states that the remedies, procedures, and rights under Title II
are the same as those available under the Rehabilitation Act. 213 The Rehabilitation Act states that its relief is the same as under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.214 In Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court ruled that private litigants can seek injunctive relief under Title VI. 215 To illustrate the
proper use of injunctive relief, the district court in Galloway required the
superior court to change its policy of excluding blind individuals from jury
service.2

16

Sovereign immunity does not pose a hurdle to White and Musgrave's
claims.2 " To begin, the suit is not against Oklahoma itself. However, even
in the event that the district court agreed with the 26th Judicial District's
argument and held that White and Musgrave cannot sue the judicial district
and must sue the state, sovereign immunity still would not limit the suit.

l (D.D.C. 1993).
See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700-01, (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22 COLKER & GROSSMAN supra note 131, at
286.
21" 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Under the Rehabilitation Act, the termination
of federal financial assistance
may also be an appropriate remedy if compliance cannot be achieved. See 34 C.F.R. § 100-01.
214 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
21" Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001); see also DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CivI. RIGHTS
210 Galloway v. Superior Ct. of D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12, 18 n.1
21

Div., TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL § 9, at 3.
216 Galloway v. Superior Ct. of D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12, 20 (D.D.C. 1993).
217 Questions of state sovereign immunity normally arise in the context of money damages, not
injunctive relief. For representative cases, see, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006);
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). Moreover, even when Congress has not validly abrogated
state sovereign immunity, injunctive relief remains an available remedy against state actors under Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Here, the Complaint states claims against individual judges, in
addition to the 26th Judicial District. Complaint, supra note 1, at 10-11. However, because this note
focuses on the claims against the judicial district and because the judges have filed their own Motion
to Dismiss, a brief consideration of the possible sovereign immunity for the district is warranted.
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First, in United States v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that Title II of
the ADA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity with respect to
claims over "conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment." 218 Though outside the scope of this note's ADA analysis, the Complaint also alleges that the judicial district's arraignment and bail proceed2 19
ings violate due process, equal protection, and the right to counsel. If
the district court accepts these arguments, then any state sovereign immunity is abrogated. Even if the district court does not, however, the Supreme
Court has read Congress's prophylactic powers to protect access to courts
broadly. 220 Dissenting in Tennessee v. Lane, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist criticized the majority for not identifying the specific conduct
at issue in the congressional record but instead relying on "a wide-ranging
22 1
account of societal discrimination against the disabled." Even if the Supreme Court has approached proportionality and congruence more strictly
in other contexts, Title II has still abrogated state immunity for cases im222
plicating access to courts.
In their Complaint, White and Musgrave ask for an injunction mandating the adoption of a "policy of non-discrimination and the provision
of reasonable modifications for arrestees with disabilities participating in
initial appearances, arraignments, and bail settings, including ...
[e]ffective communication at and about appearances, arraignments, and
bail setting." 22 3 The Complaint also includes information that could suggest more specific changes in policy that the district might adopt following
a permanent injunction. First, the 26th Judicial District could ensure defendants are not anxious or distracted by asking whether they want the jail
officer to step aside or to close the door. Second, the district could require
the judges to ask defendants whether they understand the proceedings and
have any questions. Third, depending on the outcome of the plaintiffs'
separate Sixth Amendment claim, the district could require the presence
of counsel. Fourth, even if the 26th Judicial District does not control the
jail, they could require that anyone coming before the court from the jail
has received necessary medications. Finally, even though an effort to pass
2 24
the district could
supported decision-making in Oklahoma has failed,
nonetheless allow individuals to have a support person present to help

them to understand.

218 Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159.

Complaint, supra note 1, at 43-45.
See Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34.
221 Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
222 Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34.
223 Complaint, supra note 1, at 51.
24 Oklahoma, NAT'L RES. FOR SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING (Sept. 15, 2020), http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/state-review/oklahoma [https://perma.cc/D3DD-B86S].
219
22
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CONCLUSION

Although White and Musgrave's lawsuit is the first class-action lawsuit to challenge bail practices under the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Rehabilitation Act,2 2 their claims illustrate well-documented and
alarming links among poverty, disability, and the criminal justice system.22 6 Disability impoverishes; nearly half of adults in the United States
with disabilities live in households with a total income of under
$25,000.227 People with disabilities, especially those with mental health
issues like those alleged by White and Musgrave, disproportionately fmd
themselves enmeshed in the criminal justice system. More than half of
state prisoners and jail inmates have mental health issues. 22 8 The criminal
justice system, especially through its bail practices, unfairly incarcerates
the poor; many of the nearly 500,000 unconvicted people in jails could not
afford bail.229 One in five incarcerated people have not been convicted.23 0
As these statistics briefly sketch out, White is an important lawsuit.
Judge Dishman should deny the 26th Judicial District's Motion to Dismiss. The 26th Judicial District is an entity that can be sued, and White
and Musgrave have stated a claim. Although resolution on the merits
would require more evidence and further briefing, the plaintiffs' factual
allegations in the Complaint, taken as true, demonstrate that they have
plausible grounds on which to prevail. 231
Though it is the first, White should not be the last such lawsuit. This
note encourages litigation in other jurisdictions to follow White by bringing claims against state judicial districts whose bail practices violate Title
II and the Rehabilitation Act. If districts then file motions to dismiss, this
note suggests using Jaegly for the proposition that the ADA authorizes
suits against state judicial districts even in the absence of explicit state
statutory authority. This note further suggests using McCadden to introduce the elevated likelihood standard for when public entities must prepare
policies to make reasonable modifications. These cases offer pathways to
2
White, et al. v. Hesse, et al., ACLU (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/cases/white-et-al-vhesse-et-al [https://perma.cc/6YBH-N5WX].
226 See, e.g., tenBroek & Matson, supra note 45, at 809 ("Not all who are poor are physically handicapped; not all who are handicapped are poor. But the two conditions-poverty and disability-are
historically so intermeshed as to be often indistinguishable.").
227 Kanter, supra note 41, at 423 ("As a group, people with disabilities also are less wealthy, less
independent, less educated, and less likely to reach their full potential than other disadvantaged
groups.").
2
Richard williams, Addressing Mental Health in the Justice System, NAT'L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 2015), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/addressingmental-health-in-the-justice-system.aspx [https://perma.cc/G3F2-3H53].
229 Stephanie wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save
Millions of Unconvicted Peoplefrom Jail,
Explained, Vox (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality [https://perma.cc/FB6U-3DG9].

2" Id.
231 This note has not addressed the intermediate questions of class certification.
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overcoming two hurdles likely raised in the Motions to Dismiss. On the
merits, plaintiffs may bring any number of claims under the ADA. This
note focuses on a public entity's duty to ensure effective communication
and finds enough support to predict that the claim should succeed.

